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How should we treat the cosmogonies of the early ancient Greek philosophers? 
Much work has been done in showing how these cosmogonies diff er from crea-
tion myths and how they relate to philosophical issues such as change, persist-
ence through change and matter theory. Here, using Leucippus and Democritus 
as examples, I try to show that interesting light can be shed on these cosmogonies 
by looking at them in relation to perennial problems in cosmogony and perennial 
types of solutions to these problems. Ancients and moderns have formulated both in 
diff erent ways, but there are signifi cant structural similarities. To understand ancient 
cosmogonies, we need to understand how these perennial problems were perceived, 
and what types of solutions were available. We then need to analyse how the basic 
ontological and aetiological principles of their systems lead them to choose certain 
types of solution over others.
It is generally understood that the early ancient atomists, Leucippus and Democ-
ritus reacted to the arguments of Parmenides.1 Th ey attempted to re-assert plural-
ity and change, and the possibility of cosmogony.2 Th ey posited a multiplicity of 
atoms, in a sense asserted the existence of non-being by supposing the existence 
of a void, and theorised change as the motion, coming together and separation of 
the changeless atoms. Th ere is an important principle though, which they apply in 
several diff erent contexts. Simplicius tells us that:
Leucippus supposed there to be an unlimited number of atoms that are always in 
motion and have an unlimited number of shapes on the grounds that nothing is such 
rather than such (dia to meden mallon toiouton e toiouton einai) (Physics 28, 8).
Parmenides’ argument led to the conclusion that what exists is one and is spherical. 
Th ere is no real question of its size, at least in relation to anything else.3 If there are 
to be multiple things though, what are their shapes? Here the early atomists assert 
1 This paper was prepared for publication while I held an AHRC Research Leave grant.
2 Furley, 1967:79 ff .
3 Parmenides Fr. 8.
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that there are no preferred shapes, and so with an unlimited number of atoms 
there are an unlimited number of shapes. If we accept that Leucippus and Demo c-
ritus postulated any size of atom (as opposed to Epicurus, who specifi cally limits 
atoms to very small sizes),4 then the ou mallon principle may have been applied to 
the sizes of atoms as well. Allowing for the possibility of huge atoms may not have 
been an oversight, corrected by Epicurus, as is generally thought, but an integral 
part of early atomist thought. Th e ou mallon principle is also signifi cant in relation 
to one of the challenges to cosmogony that Parmenides provides. He asks quite 
generally:
What birth will you seek for it? In what way, from what source did it grow? I will not 
allow you to think or say from not being, for it is not to be thought or said that it is 
not; and what necessity would have driven it later rather than sooner, beginning from 
nothing, to grow? (Fr. 8, 6–10).
Parmenides does not discuss place in the same manner, but one can easily see how 
his suffi  cient reason argument could be extended to where a kosmos is gener-
ated as well, given the requisite assumptions about space. How do Leucippus and 
Demo c ritus react to these issues? Th e fi rst stage of early atomist cosmogony is 
vortex formation:
Leucippus holds that the whole is unlimited... part of it is full, and part void... from 
these unlimited kosmoi come to be and are dissolved into these again. Th e kosmoi are 
generated in this manner — by “cutting off  from the unlimited” many bodies of all 
shapes move in a great void, where they are crowded together and produce a single 
vortex, where colliding with each other and circulating in all manner of ways, they 
separate out like to like (Diogenes Laertius IX, 31).
According to Aristotle, Leucippus and Democritus viewed the formation of a vor-
tex as a matter of chance:
Th ere are some who make chance the reason for the heaven and all of the kosmoi. For 
from chance arose the vortex and the motion which by separation brought the uni-
verse into a state of order (Physics II/4, 196a24 ff .).
Th ere is ample evidence in the doxographical tradition to support this attribution 
of chance.5 Th ere is a diffi  culty though, in that Leucippus says:
Nothing happens at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity.
One can resolve the apparent contradiction here in two ways. Perhaps Leucippus 
and Democritus say something happens by chance when actually they mean it oc-
4 See Dionysius, ap. Eusebium P.E. xiv, 23, 3.
5 Simplicius Physics 327, 24 and 330, 14, Th emistius Physics 49, 13, Eusebius P.E. XIV, 22, 3, Cicero De 
Natura Deorum I, 24, 66.
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curs by necessity, but the causes are unknown 
or unknowable to us.6 Alternatively, perhaps 
Aristotle calls these chance events because 
they have no teleological purpose,7 and the 
doxographical tradition then follows him, 
while Leucippus and Democritus consider 
them necessary events.
Th e problem with this is that it leaves 
Leucippus and Democritus with a rather fee ble 
reply to Parmenides’ when and where ques-
tions. Th ey accept the princi ple of suffi  cient 
reason, but are unable to give any suffi  cient 
reason for when and where ko s moi form. Out 
of necessity from a pre vious sta te of distribu-
tion and motion of matter in the universe will 
not do, as Parmenides will simply ask for a suf-
fi cient reason for the previous state.
Th e alternative is to allow Leucippus and 
Democritus an ou mallon reply to the when 
and where questions, that there are no preferred 
times or places. One version of this would be 
that there is necessity outside of the vortices, 
but there is no reason for when and where vor-
tices form. Th e second version is more radical 
in supposing there to be genuine chance events outside the vortices. Aristotle does 
recognise chance as distinct from necessity in some contexts. He says:
Empedocles says that air is not always separated out upwards but according to chance. 
He says in his cosmogony “Th us at one time it ran so by chance, but many times it was 
otherwise” (Physics II/4, 196a20 ff .).
Purposeless necessity would repeat itself. Aristotle contrasts the chance formation 
of the vortex for the early atomists with the supposed subsequent formation of 
animals, which he says happens “by nature”.8 Th is would accord with the evidence 
of Diogenes Laertius, who says that for Democritus:
Everything occurs by necessity, the vortex being the cause for the coming into being of 
all things, and this he calls necessity (IX, 45).
So perhaps outside the vortices there is no (or limited) necessity, and the fragment 
Epicurus (c. 341–271 BC).
6 So Taylor, 1999:191–192, Guthrie, 1965:419, see also Furley, 1987:148 ff., Bailey, 1928:139–143.
7 KRS, 1983:419–420.
8 Aristotle, Physics II/4, 196a25 ff .
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we have from Leucippus is missing a context or a qualifi cation. Eusebius certainly 
attributes random motion to the atoms outside of the vortices for the early atomists 
and random motion for Epicurus too:
Th ose who name the unlimited number of small bodies atoms, and who suppose a void 
unlimited in extent, say the atoms move by chance in the void. With their disorderly 
motion they collide with each other... Epicurus and Democritus held this view (Euse-
bius P.E. XIV, 22, 3).9
If there are no preferred places, this would also accord with the evidence of Hip-
polytus, who says:
Th e spaces between kosmoi are not equal, in places there are more and in others less 
(Eusebius P.E. XIV, 22, 3).
Th ere is a dilemma in cosmogony which can be expressed like this. If the original 
state of the universe is homogeneous, and it obeys laws which are place invariant, 
it is then diffi  cult to see how anything interesting will develop in that universe. If 
the original state of the universe is not homogeneous, we require some further 
explanation of why the original state is not homogeneous and why it has this 
particular state as opposed to any other. Modern big bang cosmogony has this 
problem. If we assume that what expands from the initial state is entirely homo-
geneous, and that it expands isotropically, then all that will result will be a larger 
homogeneous universe, which only diff ers from earlier stages in being less dense 
and cooler. Th e modern solution to this diffi  culty is to invoke quantum mechanics. 
At an early stage of the universe, quantum eff ects create slight inhomogeneities in 
the distribution of matter/energy throughout the universe (the famous “ripples” 
in space/time). Th e areas of greater energy density will then act as gravitational 
attractors. Depending on one’s model of cosmic evolution, stars or galaxies will 
then form around these areas of higher energy density. In reply to the question 
of why here rather than there, the answer will be that quantum mechanics is fun-
damentally probabilistic in its nature, and can only give probabilities of energy 
distribution.
Epicurus certainly adopts this type of solution. If the atoms did not swerve, 
then they would simply fall in parallel lines and no kosmoi would be formed. I 
suggest that Leucippus and Democritus also adopt this type of solution. Either 
there is a random distribution of particles when vortices might form by necessity 
in some places, or there might be genuinely random motion. In either case there 
would be no preferred places or times for vortex formation. Th e ou mallon inter-
pretation for when and where vortices form gives the early atomists a consistent 
and radical reply to Parmenides’ use of the principle of suffi  cient reason.
Th e next stage in early atomist cosmogony is a separating out from the vortex, 
9 See also Furley, 1989:77 ff.
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according to a like to like principle. Sextus Empiricus tells us that:
Democritus bases his argument on both animate and inanimate things. For animals, 
he says, congregate with animals of the same kind — doves with doves, cranes with 
cranes, and so with the other irrational animals. Similarly in the case of inanimate 
things, as we can see from seeds that are being riddled and from pebbles on the sea-
shore. For in the one case the whirling of the sieve separately arranges lentils with 
lentils, barley with barley, wheat with wheat; and in the other case, by the motion of the 
waves, oval pebbles are forced into the same place as oval pebbles, and round pebbles 
as round as pebbles.10
Th ere is not an attractive force here which brings like things together, as they are 
only sorted together when a vortex is in operation. Th e atomist kosmoi are all dif-
ferent:
Th ere are innumerable worlds which diff er in size. In some worlds there is no sun and 
moon, in others they are larger than in our world, and in others more numerous... 
Th ere are some worlds devoid of living creatures or plants or any moisture (Hippoly-
tus, Refutation of all Heresies I, 12).
In relation to such non-teleological accounts, Plato says:
Each being moved by chance, according to the power each has, they somehow fell 
together in a fi tting and harmonious manner, hot with cold or dry with moist or hard 
with soft , all of the forced blendings happening by the mixing of opposites according 
to chance. In this way and by these means the heavens and all that pertains to them 
have come into being and all of the animals and plants, all of the seasons having been 
created from these things, not by intelligence, they say, nor by some god nor some skill, 
but as we say, through nature and chance (Laws 889b).
One important point in Plato’s critique here is that the production of a kosmos 
requires unlike things to be blended. A like to like principle, such as that of the early 
atomists might explain how like things come together, but cannot explain how 
unlike things come together in a fi tting and harmonious manner.
One perennial problem in cosmogony, in modern terms, is: can the laws of 
physics alone give an adequate explanation of the origins of our universe, if we 
suppose there to be only one universe? Th e ancient version of this is whether it 
is plausible that our kosmos could be generated solely by chance and necessity 
from a primordial disorganised state. Th e modern version of this question relates 
to the values of the fundamental constants. Th ere is nothing which determines or 
explains these values. Yet in order that the universe can produce the conditions for 
life, they have to fall within very stringent limits.11
Th ere are two typical options here, the canonical forms being originated by 
10 Democritus Fr. 164.
11 Th e usual fi gure quoted here is accuracy to 1 in 1050.
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Plato on the one hand and the early atomists on the other. One can suppose there 
to be some sort of organising principle which brings the kosmos together. Plato had 
his craft sman god generating the kosmos out of a chaos, and doing so in the best 
manner possible. Th e Milesians tended to have some form of steering or organi-
sational principle inherent in nature, the most conspicuous example here being 
Anaximander.12
Th e other possibility was to suppose that there was not one kosmos, but many 
kosmoi. If there are many of these, or indeed an unlimited number, and they are 
diff erent from each other, then the chances of a kosmos like ours forming solely by 
chance and necessity are considerably enhanced. Th e clearest statement of princi-
ple along these lines is by Lucretius:
So many primordial particles, in a multitude of ways have been propelled by their own 
weight and impacts for an infi nite amount of time, and have made trial of all things 
their union could produce, it is hardly surprising if they have come into arrange-
ments and patterns of motion like those repeated by this world (De Rerum Natura, 5, 
186–194).
All of these ancient ideas fi nd modern correlates. Th ere are those who suppose that 
the values of the fundamental constants are set, either by something inherent in the 
universe or by some benevolent power extrinsic to the universe. Th ere are modern 
theories both of an infi nite number of co-existent universes, with diff erent values 
for the fundamental constants and of a single universe which expands, collapses and 
randomly resets the fundamental constants and then expands and collapses again.
One aspect brought out by a comparison between Plato and the ancient ato-
mists is that their principles of explanation guide their views on the origins of 
many aspects of the world. So with Plato, we fi nd that he rejects the multiplicity 
of shapes and sizes of atoms postulated by Leucippus and Democritus, and sup-
poses there to be two basic triangles from which he then constructs his geometri-
cal atomism. Th ese two triangles are of course the best available.13 Plato rejects a 
multiplicity of accidental kosmoi in favour of one well designed kosmos.14 Plato 
also rejects zoogony by a multiplicity of accidents leading to viable species (as 
with Empedocles) in favour of intelligently designed species.15 We know little of 
the zoogony of Leucippus and Democritus, but later atomists such as Leucretius 
accepted Empedoclean ideas on species forming by chance aft er a multiplicity of 
accidents. Aristotle is consistent in rejecting cosmogony, zoogony and the forma-
tion of the elements in favour of a world that has always been as it is now.
One of the signifi cant cosmological debates of the twentieth century was be-
12  Aristotle, Physics III/4, 203b7ff., arguably Anaximander as well, Aetius 1, 3, 4.
13 Plato, Timaeus 53d.
14 Plato, Timaeus 30c.
15 Plato, Timaeus 41b ff .
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tween steady state (SS) cosmology and big bang (BB) cosmology. BB cosmology, 
as is well known, argues that there is a determinate beginning to the universe and 
that it evolves over time. SS cosmology argued that there was no beginning to the 
universe, and that matter was continually being created. Th e universe was expand-
ing in both theories, becoming less dense in BB but retaining a constant density 
due to continual matter production in SS. SS was considered observationally and 
theoretically superior to BB, until the results of several crucial experiments went 
the way of BB cosmology. One of the issues at stake here was whether the genera-
tion of matter is a one off  event, or is occurring all the time. A related question 
was whether the physics that apply to cosmogony apply all the time, or only while 
cosmogony is occurring.
Th e ancient debate of course was not conducted at anything like the same level 
of physical sophistication, but there was an ancient debate about these issues. Th e 
Milesians are rightly praised for making cosmogony a natural process, free from 
the arbitrary intervention of the gods. In doing so, they made the processes which 
generate the kosmos as part of the physics of the world about us. So separation 
from the apeiron goes on for Anaximander, while condensation and rarefaction 
from air goes on for Anaximenes.16 One criticism that might be levelled at the Mile-
sians though is that once the kosmos has been formed, the processes that generate 
it must alter, otherwise the kosmos would lack stability and the apeiron/ air would 
all eventually be converted into the elements. Th e problem then is that the change 
in the processes looks arbitrary, and unduly cosmocentric for a physical process, if 
it changes once the kosmos is fully formed. Empedocles is then interesting in rela-
tion to the Milesians in that his principles of love and strife associate the elements 
into a homogeneous one and dissociate them into a plurality respectively. So on the 
usual interpretation of Empedocles, love generates a kosmos out of the dissociated 
elements and then destroys that kosmos by creating the one, while strife generates 
a kosmos out of the complete association of the elements and then destroys it by 
generating a total dissociation of the elements. For the fi rst time the kosmos is a by 
product of physical processes, which do not alter either in nature or intensity once 
a kosmos has been formed.
With the early atomists the processes which generate kosmoi are ongoing. Th ere 
is no end to instances of “separation from the unlimited” which form the vortices 
which bring kosmoi together. Th e physical processes seem indiff erent to the fate of 
kosmoi. Hippolytus tells us that:
Some are growing, some are in their prime, some declining, some are coming to be and 
others failing. Th ey are destroyed by falling into each other (Refutation of all Heresies 
I, 12).
Th ere is nothing in the early atomists to suggest that there is any change in any 
16 I assume here that neither Anaximander nor Anaximenes believed in multiple co-existent worlds.
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physical process when a kosmos comes into existence, and certainly cosmogony 
is not a singular occurrence. Th ere is no question of matter production for the 
ancient atomists as the atoms are eternal
Th ere is a related issue here, which is was also a matter of contention between SS 
and BB in the twentieth century. Th e SS theorists formulated what they called the 
perfect cosmological principle, which extended the cosmological principle from 
space to time as well. So for SS cosmology, not only should the kosmos appear the 
same, on a large scale, from any point of observation (the cosmological principle), 
it should also appear the same from any point in time (the perfect cosmological 
principle). If it is correct that the early atomists were the fi rst to hypothesise an 
unlimited number of co-existent kosmoi, then they would be the fi rst to accord 
to the cosmological principle. Th ere are no preferred points of observation in the 
atomist kosmos. Even where the kosmos might have been thought to be unlimited, 
as in Anaximander, his account of the stability of the earth still has it in the centre.17 
Th e kosmos of Heraclitus is the same through time, as he says that:
Th is kosmos, the same for all, was not made by Gods or men, but has always existed 
and will always exist. It is an everliving fi re, kindling in measures and going out in 
measures (Fr. 30). 
Th e early atomists though are the fi rst to allow for cosmogony and for the universe 
to be the same on a large scale through time. Th is is not so for Empedocles, whose 
one kosmos undergoes signifi cant changes through time. For the atomists, there 
are always kosmoi coming into being, and others passing away. Th ey specify no 
beginning to this process and no end. Th at there are no preferred places or times of 
observation for the early atomists is fi tting, and might be seen as another applica-
tion of the ou mallon principle.
Leucippus and Democritus then did not merely set up a philosophy which had 
implications for their view on cosmogony. Th ey actively engaged with serious per-
ennial problems in cosmogony. Th ey engaged not only with Eleatic issues, but also 
with the Milesians, Heraclitus and Empedocles on issues of whether cosmogony 
is a singular event, whether the processes that cause a kosmos to form continue 
unaltered once that kosmos has formed, and whether the large scale structure of 
the universe alters over time. On these perennial issues they choose a coherent set 
of possible solutions in line with their basic philosophical positions.
Th is methodology of examining how perennial problems and solutions in 
cosmo gony were perceived has a broader application to Greek thought on cosmo-
gony from Th ales onwards. Th ere are more problems in cosmogony that are rele-
vant to other ancient thinkers, though that of course is a subject for a much broader 
study than I can attempt here. What I hope to have shown here, using Leucippus 
and Democritus, is that such a methodology can produce some interesting insights. 
17  Aristotle De Caelo II/13 295b10 ff.
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Th is methodology also has a more specifi c implication for the study of Parmenides’ 
immediate successors. Th e early atomists clearly addressed more problems than 
those set by Parmenides, and that is signifi cant for examining the views of thinkers 
such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras, who like the early atomists are too oft en seen 
as reacting to Parmenides alone. It is also important that the Greeks formulate and 
discuss many of the issues which are central to cosmogony for the fi rst time. Th is is 
not true of any other ancient culture, where we fi nd creation myths and theogonies, 
but no philosophical or scientifi c cosmogony. Th at is a signifi cant component of 
the case for the Greeks achieving something radically diff erent from their contem-
poraries.18
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